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and her alleged
friendship
for the
United States.**

**A Brief History of Russia's Relations
with America.**

**By a Russian-American
Diplomat.**


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Washington, D. C.

**Price 10 Cents.
In Great Britain, One Shilling.**

Jewish Persecution in Russia



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BY RALPH M. MCKENZIE.

The recent inhuman treatment of the Jew in Russia has called attention more forcibly than ever to the truths made plain by the newspaper correspondent, George Kennan, in his many articles written upon the treatment of the Russian political prisoners more than fifteen years ago. The Tartar is discovered underneath the skin of the Russian lower and middle classes whenever their passions are aroused by religious prejudice or superstition. It also emphasizes the truth of the old proverb: "He that lies down with the dogs is liable to get up with fleas." Russia has been regarded for many years by the public press and by common consent as the traditional friend and ally of the United States. Can the self-respecting citizens of America afford to have such a belief go forth among the peoples

of other countries as well as those of our own? Is it right to allow Count Cassini, the Russian ambassador to urge in the faces of the charitable and philanthropic English speaking races the assertion that the United States is ungrateful because pressure is brought to bear to alleviate the suffering of the Russian Jew? Has not the time come to examine into the facts regarding the alleged traditional friendship of Russia for the United States? The autocracy of Russia, may be, and often is, administered by a man acting as Czar who is charitable and humane, but the administration extends down through many agencies which are controlled by ignorant and religious prejudices. The result is, the massacre of the Jews, and the suppression of all means of publicity and public discussion which might create a healthy popular sentiment in Russia itself. There are many reasons why Russia fears the awakening of the United States to the fact that their strongest rival in the trade and commerce of the East, in time is bound to be Russia. Therefore pressure from the United States at this time against the persecution of the Jew will have greater influence than it would have had at any other time in our history. It is only the protest of the United States at this time which is holding in abeyance temporarily the complete Russian absorption and assimilation of the province of Manchuria in China.

DIPLOMACY AND LYING.

The average citizen of the United States never was a great admirer of that class of public functionaries who have been sent abroad from time immemorial by their governments (in the words of one of the greatest of them) "to lie for the good of their country." The pleasant fiction granted them by common consent, that an Ambassador represents the person of his sovereign, must of course be accepted with good-natured indulgence.

The recent bold attempt to foist upon the British Ambassador at Washington the onus of having conceived and put into operation a plan to prevent the United States from attacking Spain in Cuba in 1898, has naturally called attention all over the world to the present duties and past performances of those functionaries known in various countries under many titles as ambassadors, ministers, plenipotentiaries, resident agents, etc.

The United States "State Department" is generally regarded by men, who have knowledge of its inner workings, as possessing the very best and most accurate means of information regarding foreign affairs generally, and therefore, the inner history leading up to the latest attempt to discredit Great Britain as well as other friendly nations with the people of America, is well canvassed and thoroughly known by the alert authorities at

Washington. It has been on account of this knowledge of the customs prevalent in foreign diplomacy, the secret agents, the plentiful use of secret funds, the persuasion of newspapers, the dilettante toying with truth so marked in the dealings between the European chancelleries of the past century, that has caused the United States to inaugurate a policy of straightforward business-like dealing with other countries which in Europe some years ago was denominated "shirt-sleeve diplomacy." It is generally regarded abroad and in the United States as having been very successful, perhaps for the same reason that Bismarck alleged when he said "I always tell the truth to diplomats, as I know none of them will believe me." The recent agreements of the nations relative to the status in China was negotiated in the main by straightforward and honest diplomacy. There was an exception, however, which was known to every diplomat at the time, and recently that exception was made patent to the whole world.

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY—THE GLAD HAND.

The old diplomacy of Talleyrand, Gortschakoff, Cavour and their ilk still governs some of the foreign offices of European nations, but there is one country where it is yet particularly strong—Russia. This is the country which through one of its

ablest diplomats at present, Count Cassini, transferred from China, where he outwitted most of the diplomats of other countries, to the United States, is carrying out a well-defined Russian purpose with the persistent aim in force since the Civil War, namely, to outpoint other friendly nations with the American people and to create the impression that Russia has been the *one consistent and steadfast friend* of the United States since the time of Catherine II.

For this reason, certain publications of the press were recently made in Europe and in the United States and an agitation began to destroy the prestige of Great Britain as a friend of America, and to break down the great influence that Germany was acquiring. A continued agitation is kept up in the German and French press against England and the agents of the Russian government all over the world are known to be serving their government faithfully and well.

It is principally with the record of Russian diplomacy in the United States that this article is to deal; for that is but a chapter from the book of its diplomacy all over the world.

Ordinarily this subject would be of secondary importance, and would merely challenge the attention of the student of history, but in view of the political and economical changes which have taken place in the United States within the past four years, by reason of the acquisition of the Philip-

pine Islands, and the recent treatment of the Russian Jews, it becomes imperative to give the subject the most intelligent and earnest consideration, to the end that the world may know something of modern diplomacy from the Russian standpoint.

While the changes here referred to, all of them potent politically and commercially, were not of the seeking of the United States, their import cannot be stifled, because of the fact that they bring America into direct conflict with all the commercial aims and political aspirations of Russia. As a consequence, it is interesting to inquire whether the professions of friendship recently heard from that quarter are false or genuine, and whether, as their near neighbor in the Philippines, the American people can rely upon the pledges of good will and amity which no less a personage than the ambassador of Russia, to the United States, has repeatedly suggested in newspaper interviews and otherwise. His sweeping declaration that Russia's friendship for America is not of today's or yesterday's growth, but that it has been pronounced and active from the time of the American revolutionary war down to the present, is picturesque as well as interesting.

RUSSIAN POLICY ANTAGONISTIC TO THE UNITED STATES.

Fortunately there are many in official life not only in the United States but in other countries

who know the difference between reality and fiction, and who are not blind to the stirring incidents of the period embraced between 1850 and the present.

The writer is conversant with Russian diplomatic events from 1857 to the present time. For several years he enjoyed the personal acquaintance, and, in some degree at least, the confidence of that great Russian statesman and diplomat, Prince Gortschakoff, whose well-known policy was the unification of the empire of which he was such an able chancellor. He has also enjoyed the acquaintance of other Russian diplomats, and the knowledge thus acquired causes him to consider with caution the statements of Count Cassini, and at the same time, present the varied circumstances herein related in a manner that cannot be controverted.

At the very outset, the writer desires to assert—and he will demonstrate every position he assumes by historical evidence and indubitable truths—that the present Oriental policy of Russia is antagonistic to the best interests of the United States, and hence Russia's diplomatic "friendship" for America should be regarded as purely academic.

When Russia temporarily shifted the designs and scope of her Oriental policy from the Bosphorus to the Pacific, the conditions were totally different from those that now confront the United States. Such a thing as a war between the United States and Spain was not then thought of,

and the acquisition of the Philippines was not even dreamed of by any power in Europe or elsewhere—Russia was at that time in alliance with Spain, and the latter's rule of the archipelago was in perfect harmony with her autocratic policy.

Russia's sudden demand on China for a southern outlet for her Trans-Siberian railroad, by which pretext she robbed Japan of that country's fruits of victory in its late war—(namely, Port Arthur, Talien-Wan and Liao-Tang promontory)—and her still more recent attempt to hold an entire province in China, show that she believed the whole oriental carrying trade will be diverted to and absorbed by that railroad. Filled with this conviction, she concluded that thenceforward she would permit no opposition to her commercial or political activity in the Orient. Had the Russian diplomats conceived the idea of the United States acquiring and permanently holding the Philippines, they would have seriously paused before reaching such an unwise conclusion, but when Russia once reaches a determination it is like the law of the Medes and the Persians, never changed. The present Russian Ambassador in the United States, in one of his late newspaper interviews, admitted with emphasis that "Russia is interested in the Philippines, of course."

WHY RUSSIA FEARS THE UNITED STATES.

Russia has now both political and commercial reasons for fearing the permanent control of the

Philippines by the United States, and it is not difficult to see and understand them. Such a contingency threatens not only to endanger her Trans-Siberian railway, but, still worse, it may result in the ultimate loss to her of Siberia. A glance at the map will show that one of the terminals of the much-vaunted railroad is at a point within a short distance of the Philippines. Should the latter islands become populated with Americans, and they probably will, it would be but a short time until the liberal and progressive ideas of a great western people would be infused among the residents of Siberia, thus revolutionizing their manner of living and educating the benighted denizens of that unfortunate region.

It is a well-known fact that the chief secret of the Czar's power over his subjects is their indifference, and he has, therefore, much to fear from the introduction into Siberia of a strong love for liberty and enlightenment.

Then, again, it will not be denied that the Trans-Siberian railroad was completed and laid down in the expectation that it would enable Russia to command the carrying trade of the East, but—with the United States as a near neighbor—the conditions are changed. The establishment of the several American lines of fast steamers from San Francisco to Honolulu, Manila, China and Japan will seriously and necessarily detract from the amount of trade which Russia has so confi-

dently counted upon, and under such circumstances it would be folly to say that she looks with favor or satisfaction on American possession of the Philippines.

Russia is now a competitor of the United States in the Eastern markets, and her manufacturers are looking in all directions for an outlet for their products. There is a deep significance in this which the people of the United States would do well to heed. With unlimited cheap labor (Russian mechanics only receive from \$4 to \$9 per month) and with vast quantities of raw material to draw from, Russia not only expects to figure as a competitor but to actually shut out France, Germany, England and the United States from the Oriental markets. The proof of this is apparent in the reluctance with which Russia is carrying out her pledges to the United States in withdrawing her troops from Manchuria.

In the accomplishment of this purpose, however, she is now beginning to see her danger, and is taking measures accordingly. Knowing that the American people are grateful to those who in any way aid or sympathize with them in their difficulties, and feeling that they entertain a warm regard for Great Britain for the firm, friendly stand she took in the late war with Spain; and that the American acquisition of the Philippines, combined with the friendship of England and Japan at the same time, placed the new Oriental policy of Rus-

sia in danger, the Czar's advisers are seeking by every means possible to counteract this danger.

COUNT CASSINI MAKES POINTS.

To accomplish this she sent her most astute diplomat, Count Cassini, as ambassador to the United States. Soon after his arrival in Washington he availed himself of the power of the press to influence the people of the United States in favor of Russia as against England; and in his very first newspaper interview he endeavored to prove to the American people that they owed Russia a debt of gratitude for uninterrupted friendship from the birth of the republic down to the present time, especially during the Civil War; and, furthermore, in language more forcible than elegant, he stated that England's friendship for the United States during the Spanish War was simply "a ruse"—a mere hollow pretence as hypocritical to the United States as it was unjust to other European powers.

In support of his position Count Cassini, as Russian ambassador, made (through the New York Herald and Washington newspapers) the following startling revelation, quoted in his own words:

"Alexander II, the late Emperor of Russia, out of pure friendship offered to aid you during your civil war with treasures of gold and his fleet of ships, with orders to the commanding admiral,

Lossowsky, instructing him—in the event of recognition of the Confederacy by France and England—to place his fleet at the disposition of the American government. This meant that the recognition was to be the signal for the declaration by Russia of war against those powers, and there cannot be the slightest doubt that this knowledge, known to the French and English cabinets, held them in check.”

The statements contained in the foregoing interview, coming from an ambassador, are somewhat astounding, for they exhibit not only a lack of knowledge of the conditions of his own country at the time, but also ignorance of the United States, to which he is officially accredited.

The Russian fleet of five or six vessels (wooden vessels mentioned in the interview) arrived in New York harbor in September, 1863, at which time everybody familiar with the event knows that there was no danger or possibility of the Confederacy being recognized either by France or England, as Forts Henry and Donelson had fallen nearly two years previous, and with their fall disappeared the last vestige of the possibility of European intervention. The writer has personally examined the archives of the State Department at Washington, and found that there is not a single scintilla of evidence to warrant or sustain Count Cassini regarding the offering by Russia of her “treasures of gold,” or the use of her fleet as alleged.

CATHERINE'S HATRED OF AMERICA.

Furthermore, the writer is thoroughly familiar with and knows the purpose of the visit of the Russian fleet to this country in 1863, this knowledge being derived from his acquaintance with Prince Gortschakoff, the Russian Chancellor, and he knows that its mission to American waters was—not to aid or benefit the United States—but rather to protect itself from what was then believed to be an impending danger at home.

In order that the public may know the true attitude of Russia towards the United States from the incipency of the American republic down to the present time, particularly during the Civil War in this country, let the following historical synopsis suffice:

During the whole period of the American revolutionary struggle for independence Catherine II, was Empress of Russia, and in alliance with England, and at the most critical period of the struggle, she offered to furnish to Great Britain an army of Cossacks and Tartars to crush the revolutionists. This hostile action aroused the deepest anxiety in America and caused the Continental Congress to frequently communicate with Arthur Lee, who was then American envoy to Paris and Berlin. Catherine's project did not succeed, however, because of the fortunate interposition of Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, who was

friendly to the Americans and who declined to permit troops destined for British use in America to cross his territory, thus practically acknowledging the United States as a belligerent. This firm stand of Frederick the Great, whom Catherine feared, more than any other cause prevented her design from being consummated.

Later on, or about 1780, Catherine suggested to Emperor Joseph II of Austria a plan of mediation for France, Spain and Holland, who were then at war with Great Britain, but as the Americans were considered by her as "rebels," she did not include them in the proposal. The Continental Congress, believing that the United States was included in Catherine's project, dispatched Francis Dana, a gentleman of highest culture, who subsequently became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, to Russia as its envoy. On his arrival there, he was not only denied official reception but was subjected to a series of mortifying rebuffs, as humiliating to himself as it was detrimental to his country. During his stay, he was placed under police surveillance, his mail was opened by the officials, and numerous other indignities were offered to him. This condition of affairs continued for several years, and in the meantime peace was concluded between Great Britain and the United States, the former recognizing the independence of the American republic. But even then Catherine persisted in her refusal to recog-

nize the American envoy, and as a matter of fact never did recognize him until she was formally and officially notified by England that an American Minister had been received at the Court of St. James. In fact, so numerous, varied and objectionable were the provisos and conditions formulated by Catherine as conditions precedent to Mr. Dana's being received as an envoy, that the gentleman, in a letter to John Adams, dated at St. Petersburg, May 15, 1783, wrote as follows: "This objection (of Catherine's) is of so extraordinary a nature that it is impossible, in my opinion, that the United States can ever comply with it. If they should incline to do it, it shall never be done upon my request. I would perish before I would propose it to them. If they have not lost all sense of their dignity, and I believe they have not, they would sooner resolve never to send a Minister to this Court during the life of (Catherine) the present sovereign."

That Catherine was a pronounced enemy of the United States during the American struggle for independence, is a solemn truth. Note what is recorded of her by Wharton, p. 425, Vol. 6 of his *American Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence*: "That Catherine was resolutely averse to the American cause until after the definite peace, there is now no question."

Again, it is stated by Russian writers and diplomats that Alexander the First, Emperor of Russia,

during the American war of 1812, showed his friendship for the United States by offering to act as mediator between America and Great Britain. There can be no doubt that such an offer was made by that monarch, but it was for selfish motives and not from any mark of friendship for the United States. Alexander the First at that time was in alliance with England to counteract the influence and growth of the power of Napoleon the First, and fearing an attack from him, and expecting aid from his ally, England, he exerted his influence to bring the American war to a speedy conclusion in order that England would help him and be the better able to repel any attack which Napoleon the First designed to make upon him.

WHY THE SERFS WERE FREED.

Alexander the Second, the Emperor of Russia, who is stated to have offered the United States during the Civil War "treasures of gold" and the use of his fleet, was not a man of strongly marked character, but on the contrary was weak and vacillating and swayed by two men in whom he had implicit confidence, namely, Prince Gortschakoff, whom he created Chancellor of the Russian Empire, and his assistant, Mr. Hamburger. After the Crimean War, and the conclusion of the treaty of peace at Paris, in 1856, Alexander the Second found himself at the head of a bankrupt and

chaotic empire, the result of that war. The first thought was to reorganize his disorganized army and replenish his lost navy, which was destroyed by the English and French at Sebastopol and elsewhere. This entailed a vast expenditure of money. Russia being hopelessly bankrupt at that time, the money had to be raised by heavy taxation. Against this, the Russian landed nobility, upon whom it fell heaviest, protested, and demanded from Alexander a parliament and a constitution in order to check those vast expenditures and to know for what purpose the money was sought to be raised. This did not suit Alexander, and, fearing a revolt at the hands of those powerful nobles who controlled the serfs, and in order to weaken them Prince Gortschakoff suggested that he abolish serfdom and thereby gain the support of the serfs against the nobles, which he accepted. As soon as the ukase was issued by Alexander freeing the serfs, he gained their entire confidence and support and weakened the power of the nobility in Russia to such an extent that their least opposition to the Emperor's schemes condemned them to Siberia or to the dungeons of Schlusberg or Peter and Paul fortresses. Thus serfdom in Russia was abolished not from philanthropic motives but for political expediency.

As already stated, the Russian government was then almost bankrupt, her paper money being nearly worthless. After great difficulty, she negotiated

through the Berlin bankers, Mendelsohn, Bartholdi & Co., a lottery loan of one hundred million of roubles for which she was forced to pay six per cent. interest, with fourteen per cent. discount, giving as security the entire Imperial domain. This loan was made for alleged public improvements. From this it will be readily seen Russia was not in a position during the American Civil War, to offer the United States her "treasures of gold."

WHY THE RUSSIAN FLEET CAME TO NEW YORK.

Now in regard to the "fleet of ships" which she is alleged to have offered to the United States during 1863, as a "mark of Russian friendship," and of which so much is made in the published interviews it is well to consider a few facts.

The Ambassador of Russia referred to the friendly visit of the Russian fleet to New York. The present Secretary of State, Hon. John Hay, who at that period was Private Secretary to President Lincoln, is assuredly well informed as to the facts connected with this visit, and he cannot, the writer is satisfied, be mislead by any diplomatic misrepresentations. It would seem that Count Cassini had not been informed by his foreign office as to the complications then embarrassing Russia. Prince Gortschakoff, the Chancellor of the Empire, had demanded in a peremptory manner from the signatory powers of the treaty of Paris in 1856, the abro-

gation of the clause of the treaty which prohibited Russia from maintaining an armed navy in the Black Sea. England and France strenuously opposed and objected to this. Prince Gortschakoff, in reply, sent what might almost be regarded as an ultimatum; and, fearing that this act would be followed by hostilities, pretended to the United States Minister at St. Petersburg, Hon. Cassius M. Clay, that Russia had a warm friendship for this country and told him that she would send a fleet to American waters to create the impression in England and France that there was a secret treaty for an offensive and defensive alliance between the United States and Russia. But the wily diplomat had another and more substantial object in this act—for he could not blind England and France as to Russia's inability to help the United States—and this was, that in case of an outbreak of hostilities as the consequence of his ultimatum, that fleet would be safe in neutral waters and not cooped up for destruction, as Russia's fleet had once been in the harbor of Sebastopol. The visit of Prince Alexis, brother of Alexander the Third, to the United States with that fleet was because Russia was at that time without an ally in Europe, and had no other place of safety to send it to, and for the further reason that the flagship which he commanded contained the treasures of the Imperial family, sent here for safety; also for the reason that at that

very time nihilism was rampant in Russia, and the nobility were secretly plotting against the life and the throne of the Czar, and had hostilities again begun with England and France, a rebellion in Russia would assuredly have followed.

From this recital of facts it may be perceived that in reality the United States was the friend of Russia when she manifested so much enthusiasm on the arrival of the Russian fleet in the harbor of New York, instead of Russia being the friend of the United States. Nevertheless, that enthusiasm is still harped upon by the Russian diplomats for their benefit only.

THE ALLY OF SPAIN.

In regard to the alleged friendship of Russia for the United States during the late War with Spain, Count Cassini in one of his interesting interviews in the New York Herald, said:

"At no time during the negotiations between Spain and the United States, or during the period of actual hostilities between these countries, has Russia in any way encouraged Spain, nor has Spain asked Russia's assistance, and there has never been any concert of European powers to aid Spain against this country," and finally he said that "the friendship of England for America is a 'fake' and unjust to the other European powers."

It is a well known fact, proved by the Spanish

Red Book and confirmed by the entire Russian contemporary press, that Russia, in the war of 1898 was a secret ally of Spain. Did the Russian Ambassador at any time prior to the destruction of Cervera's fleet, ever officially express to the United States government any sentiment approaching sympathy, or congratulations regarding the stand and policy of President McKinley? If he did, no one ever heard of it. The fact of the matter is, the Russians were carrying water on both shoulders.

Believing that the American people entertained a feeling of gratitude toward Russia for her alleged aid to America in the Civil war, her diplomats thought they would be consulted and that Russia's wishes would control the policy of the United States with regard to Spain. All her military leaders thought that Spain would threaten the American seacoast and destroy the United States fleets, and in this belief Russia, while keeping in the background herself, sought to have her ally, France, make a naval demonstration in American waters and in that way furnish a semblance of European opposition to the United States. But Dewey's victory at Manila, followed as it was, by England's firm stand in favor of the United States, set Russian diplomats to thinking more seriously.

Count Cassini did not mention the secret offensive and defensive alliance between Russia and Spain, which was renewed in April, 1898, when the

Queen Regent condescended against all precedents of Spanish etiquette to visit in person the Russian Ambassador at Madrid.

Again, Count Cassini makes the frank admission that prior to his arrival in the United States, and during the American war with Spain, he visited Berlin and Paris, during a period teeming with important international events and left his embassy at Washington to be represented by a charge d'affairs. Frequent consultations were held during his six weeks' sojourn in Paris with M. Hanotaux, the then French Minister of Foreign Affairs, and with Senor Castillo, the Spanish Ambassador to France. But on the other hand he did not have any confidential or friendly conference with the American Ambassador, General Porter, in Paris at that time. As soon as the news reached Paris of the destruction of Cervera's fleet, he speedily hastened to his post in Washington and sought the columns of the newspapers in which to profess undying friendship for the United States!

And when Lord Salisbury, The English Premier, in a speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet, alluded to the friendly relations existing between the United States and England, Count Cassini, after reading it, again gave out a statement to the New York Herald (repeating it several times to the interviewer so as not to be misunderstood) as follows, verbatim:

"What do the Americans think of Salisbury's

speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet? They cannot regard it with any favor. I am astonished at what he said concerning America. It was not a compliment, and I believe you Americans will so regard it when you have time to think it over. He would make it appear, if he could, that there exists a compact or understanding between his and your country. Ah, America needs not the friendship of England to become a great power. She is a great power. England needs the friendship of America—that is why she speaks as she does now. England wants America to help her to her schemes, and America will not let herself be used, I am sure."

THE VALUE OF THE TRADE OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.

That there is an alliance between England and the United States cannot be doubted, but that alliance consists simply in a commercial and financial mutual interest, which luckily cannot be severed under any condition likely to arise now or in the future. Americans are living to-day in a different sphere from what they did thirty years ago.. Political alliances on paper in the present day of quick and ever changing conditions, do not amount to the parchment on which they are written.

England has immense money holdings in the United States, and; in order to secure and make profitable investments, the prosperity of the United States is of vital importance to her. On the

other hand, American national prosperity depends somewhat on England's prosperity. For instance: take the American farmer and Southern cotton planter. A large part of their surplus products is shipped to England, which is dependent on outside sources for her supplies. With England as an enemy, a great market for the farmers and cotton planters would be closed. Russia is one of the keenest competitors for the trade of England in this respect, and under the circumstances it would be a commercial and financial mistake for America to unite with the Czar in any unfriendly movement against Great Britain.

Furthermore, the American trade with Russia is comparatively unimportant. In proof of this, the official statistics of the United States for 1901 show that the total export business from the United States to Russia during that year amounted only to \$8,084,228, and this was perhaps as large a volume of trade as is usually recorded in favor of that country. How insignificant this trade exhibit is, may be realized by comparison with that of the smallest powers in Europe. For example, little Denmark's showing the same year amounted to \$16,178,613; that of Belgium to \$49,390,259; that of Holland to \$84,382,470; that of Sweden and Norway to \$11,844,152, while that of Mexico amounted to \$36,475,350.

It will thus be seen that the export trade to the great empire of Russia, even with the building of

the Trans-Siberian railroad, is worth to the United States less than one-half what that of the little kingdom of Denmark amounts to. How phenomenally small it seems when placed beside the 1901 export trade of the United States to England and her colonies, which amounted to nearly \$800,000,000, about half of America's exports.

In addition to this trade, England has in the United States millions upon millions of dollars invested in railroads, mines and manufacturing interests. Her possessions are connected with America by fast steamers and all the modern facilities for business communication. The United States export and import trade with Great Britain and her colonies, together with the exchanges and financial transactions, amounts to nearly two thousand millions of dollars a year.

Germany has invested in this country in railroads, property, and manufacturing interests amounting to vast sums. France and Italy in a large degree are also interested in the prosperity of this country. Has Russia any financial interests in the United States!!

THE ALASKA INCIDENT.

A great deal of speculation has been indulged in as to why Alaska was ceded to the United States. Russian writers and diplomats make it plain, in their way, that it was through friendship, pure and simple. Nothing could be further from the

truth. In 1860 Prince Gortschakoff, through the English Ambassador, Lord Napier, offered Alaska to England for 10,000,000 of rubles, or \$5,000,000, which offer was refused by the British government.

The real reason of Russia's anxiety for selling Alaska was that an English dyer invented the present mode of dyeing sealskins, prior to which they were worthless. The sealskins soon became fashionable and the demand for them increased, thus enhancing the value of the fur. In fact, the sealskin business grew to be so valuable that poaching became a profitable industry, which, though illegal, could not be prevented by the Russian officials. Russian diplomats soon foresaw difficulties with Great Britain arising out of the depredations of the Canadian poachers and sealers, and in order to avoid the complications which would arise (Alaska being considered by them valueless for commercial and strategic purposes) made plain their anxiety to get rid of the territory. In 1864 Russia again renewed her offer of sale of Alaska to England, through her then Ambassador Sir Andrew Buchanan, and was again refused. Finally, in 1866, the offer was made to the United States, through Hon. Cassius M. Clay, United States Minister to Russia at the advanced figure of \$7,000,000 and Wm. H. Seward, the American Secretary of State, accepted the offer of purchase more to avoid complications with Russia than oth-

erwise. At that time, also, a number of claims of citizens of the United States against Russia had been filed with the State Department. The aggregate amount of these claims was deducted from the purchase money and the balance paid to Russia.

With the acquisition of Alaska the United States purchased the complications with Great Britain which the wily Russian diplomat wished to avoid. These complications cost the American government a great deal of money, but were happily settled by the Paris Court of Arbitration. Had Russia been unable to dispose of Alaska, her troubles over the seal fishery would have inevitably led her to war with Great Britain, which contingency would have been costly if not fatal to Russia at that time.

THE REAL FRIENDS OF AMERICA.

During the American Civil war the Russian government prohibited traffic in the United States bonds or currency in any shape or form on the Russian exchanges. Very few Russians were found fighting for the preservation of the Union, and the Russian government again showed its unfriendliness towards the United States by *outlawing* the few who entered the military and naval service and became American citizens. And with regard to the intimation that Russia sent her

fleet to New York to give the United States moral if not material aid during the American Civil War, let it be said that America needed no foreign government to help her in the struggle, nor did she seek any.

The material aid received at that time was not from Russia but from the Irish and Germans, who, at Lincoln's call, hurried to form themselves into companies, regiments, brigades, and divisions, and led by gallant commanders of their own nationalities, fought with honor and distinction for their adopted country till the close of the war.

It is a well known fact that the German Government, instead of following in the wake of Russia, encouraged its citizens to buy millions upon millions of dollars' worth of United States 5-20 bonds, and even permitted recruiting for the Union forces in the fatherland.

In conclusion, it is only necessary to draw the inference that from the time of Catherine the Second to the present day, Russia has been inimical to the interests of the united States and the only occasions upon which she has ever shown any seeming friendship for America have been when she expected to further her own interests. Such is a chapter of the diplomacy of Russia affecting the United States and their relations to other nations.

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
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